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. I. ON CROSS APPEAL, HATCH'S MARCH 3, 2001, CHANGE 
ORDER NO. 3 CONSTITUTES AN ASSUMPTION OR 
REAFFIRMATION BY THE PARTNERSHIPS p i ?. y \ ppt IIM I II' lin 
AGENT OF THE $78,000 DEBT. 1 
A. Hatcli Acted witlini tlle Scope of his Author ity When he Assumed and 
Reaffirmed E P C O ' s Debt for the Partnership. 
1 he question presented by this appeal is whether a general partnership (51-SPR/ 
Broadstone^ i ,
 >lilK j t > 1 > . .ou) in money loaned or advanced by a i .<-. ' •) 
formally ratified, confirmed, assumed, and acknowledged as a partnership debt by the 
latter partner. There are only two possibilities with respect to the $78,000. Either it was 
a partnership u c u a; :ne time it was advanced, fa proposition rejectee! :••. uw JKU ^ •:.: i 
construction contract agreeing to renav the sum from partnership assets. The lacts do not 
admit of any other resi ill. 
S p e a l k a l i > ji!iM<tijii tiic inai * .- ..: ii.iiiiw \\\^. me ^.,* s; ••' vas not a pai ti lei si: up 
debt, tl le testii i 101 i.y in i tl ne it ee : rd j vsas tc ll ic effect tl lat t 1 le pai tnei si rip betweei I I latel i and 
Chimento had progressed to the ponit that Hatch was actively lining up potential tenants 
This section replies to Part 1\ ;^  i -SPR's Appellate l>i ici. pages ^3 u • 4 • and to 
i\>\: • 4 5K ivph brief, pages 9 •<* 
2
 For ease of reference Change Order # 3, and the check winch prompted it, are 
attached hereto as Addendum A. 
Neither judge Schofield nor Judge Mou formally made a finding as to the date 
tl: ie 51 SPR/Broadstone partnership w-^ formed, although they definitely found, that the 
1 
and/or leases for the Northshore buildings. [TR. 60]. Although 51-SPR had not funded 
the construction monies, nor had the parties' purchased the property, Hatch had selected 
EPCO to be the contractor and was actively pursuing the partnerships goals and 
ambitions. [Tr. 6063]. Hatch solicited EPCO in his capacity as a representative of the 
Northshore project, for money to be used to pay Hubble Engineering for the civil 
engineering on Northshore I and II. Id. The trial court found that when Richard 
Ellsworth advanced the money to Hatch, he did not learn whether it was used to pay for 
engineering on the Williams property (although still the Northshore I and II project) or 
the Automall property. [See, Findings and Conclusions, App. "C," f 5, p. 5, % 25, p. 10-
11 to Appelee's answering brief]. However, there was no doubt in the record, and 
everyone was in agreement at trial, that Hatch represented that the $78,000 would be 
used for the Northshore I and I properties, where EPCO was to perform the construction. 
Id. 
Having said all of the above, in this appeal, EPCO is less concerned with 
challenging the trial court's findings that the $78,000 was not a partnership debt at the 
time it was incurred. Rather, EPCO challenges the trial court's conclusions (or rather the 
absence thereof) that Guy Hatch as a managing partner did not made the $78,000 a 
partnership debt when he modified the construction contract by Change Order # 3 
between Broadstone and EPCO, thereby agreeing to reimburse EPCO the $78,000 from 
June 15, Addendum certainly qualified as a partnership agreement. 
2 
partnership assets. It is simply contradictory for the two trial courts and for this Court to 
find that nearly S; ini.ur,, viuiiars in construction contracts (in .,.-..
 fc 
( •* ••• • — : . . . : • • - * , sin^K eel \ executed and 
formally signed change order — signed during a time when the managing partner had 
full actual, implied and apparent aiilllority — is not a partnership debt. 
The general KIIC is sv.1 ioiUi in .v> \ . , , „•.. . . ; C L . . 
A loan made to a partner oeiore tne lonnaiion 01 a paiineiship is nui a 
partnership debt for which the firm is liable, unless it is expressly assumed 
by the partnership However, in view of the Uniform Partnership Act 's 
provision thai all partners are liable joiml\ tor all debts and obligations of 
the partnership, parties who form a partnership and agree to convert 
IIicliviciual debt into a debt of ihe partnership become liable individually for 
the debt so converted just as though the partnership had contracted the debt 
in the first instance. [Emphasis added/] 
51-SPR would have this court ignore the express provisions of Uniform 
Partnership Act, to the effect that each partner is an agent of the partnership for the 
purposes of its business, and the actions of of each partner IMIKK the partnership. ;. lah 
end'1 Ann ° 1"^  I l|l|» ' Mi' "'» i"t n\ ^ hei l i r i H a l ' l i ' s . r ,i* 1 P" 'MI ihe p e tn^i^'Mp iMhe 
time he signed change order No. 3 is governed bv ai'encx laws The relevant agency 
principles are as follows: The contract of the agent is the contract of the principal, and 
the principal ma\ be sued ilicieon (utr.ji.j \. ticisiiDuuui. > M r. j i 
4
 Utah Code Ann.§ 48-1-6 states that M[e]very partner is an agent of the 
partnership for purposes of its business, and the act of every partner...binds the 
partnership." See, also, Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990).(Joint ventine 
partner is liable for debts inoinv.l bv other partner) 
3 
1992). (Holding that agents who signed a deed to a buyer on behalf of an undisclosed 
corporation bound the corporation by their actions). The principal is liable for the acts 
and agreements of the agent performed within the scope of the agent's authority. Id. 
The fact that the agent acts in his own name without disclosing his 
principal does not preclude liability on the part of the principal when he is 
discovered to be such by a third party who has dealt with the agent. This is 
true even if the third person dealing with the agent did not learn of the 
existence of the principal until after the bargain was completed. Id at 110. 
[Citations omitted]. 
No one in this case has ever suggested that Hatch did not have actual, implied and 
apparent authority to act for the partnership in the construction of Northshore I and II. 
The Joint Venture Agreement (appearing as Addendum A to the EPCO's Appellee's 
answering brief) confers all such authority on Guy Hatch, and the owner of 51-SPR has 
repeatedly acknowledged at trial and in depositions that Hatch had express authority to 
sign contracts and change orders, which actions he repeatedly performed. [Tr. 381-382]. 
Thus the only remaining question is whether of not the signing of Changer Order 3 was 
within the scope of Mr. Hatch's authority as the construction manager of North Shore I 
and II. 
51-SPR argues at page 17 of its reply brief that the change order cannot be 
binding on the partnership because it was not for the purpose of carrying on the business 
of the partnership in the usual way. However, 51-SPR completely misconstrues the 
"scope of agency" principles governing the change order. The correct rule governing 
agency is set forth in Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009 
4 
(I Jtah 2002) . 
The fact that Hansen committed fraud does not necessarily mean he acted 
outside of his authority. Scope of authority refers to those acts which are so 
closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly 
and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even 
though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the 
employment. Id. [Citations 011lilted]. 
WiHillcy i n v o U - i the actions of a real estate agent who fraiiamcnm aiienru n-iing 
agreements < ill i a seller 1 1 le Coi u t of • \ ppeals 1 leld tl I; it tl IC I i ai idi il ::i it : u ;tioi is coi ild 
never be construed to be willnil the agent 's authority. Flie Supreme Court disagreed 
saying tllat scope is determined by iliree factors: 1) Ihe agent 's actions must be of the 
kind the agent is employed to perloi in: 1) the agent 's comi..* .nasi ix \ \ i : . . *, UM, . 
( ) f - P •• : t f • • ' . • • • • t i l ' • i • ' 
agent 's act must be motivated, at least in part, by MIL- puipose of serving the principal 's 
interest. Id at 1017. The Supreme Court considered the fraudulent altering of the listing 
agreements against these factors and i-^ki . i ^ : ihe agent 's actions, aiir.ougn : ;i:.;-:; ;t, 
1 }
 /ere 1 vitl lii I tl le scope ol 1 lis agency and v >ei e ir i lpi ited to 1 1 n t pi ii icipa] Id 
\pply the forgoing standards to the case at bar, this court can rule as a matter of 
law that Change Order No. 3 is binding on the partnership. First, the change order 
signed : \ i latch agreeing to repay the $ 78,000 ad' 'ai iced by EI }CO was well \ it!: lii i tl t z 
"gener ' J • ; * :' ..m."-:1* 'nueca, both Judge Schofield and 
Judge Stott held that dozens of change orders signed by Hatch were binding upon 5 1 -
SPP The TV Agreement specified that Hatch was authorized to enter construction 
5 
contracts, and construction managers inherently and by definition are authorized to 
manage projects and to sign construction documents. With Guy Hatch out of the picture, 
it is not surprising that the evidence was inconclusive as to v/hether or not Hatch actually 
paid the engineering firm he represented to EPCO that he was going to pay, but there was 
never any doubt that the engineering in question related to North Shore I and II, over 
whom Hatch was the designated agent. 
Second, the change order was signed at the height of construction, when scores of 
construction documents (i.e. change orders, leases, payment requisitions, purchase 
orders, construction loan documents, contracts, and like documents) were being signed 
by Hatch on behalf of the partnership. The change order in question was done in the 
ordinary course of the business of running the partnership affairs.5 Hatch signed the 
change order during working hours of the day, while he signed other change orders, and 
did so in response to this and other contract documents which were being processed by 
him. Thus, Hatch's actions in signing the change order were within the ordinary time 
and spacial boundaries of Hatch's responsibilities for the partnership. Again, all of these 
related agreements (i.e. contracts and change orders) signed by Hatch have been 
enforced against 51-SPR. 
Third, signing the Change Order was motivated at least in part for the 
5
 51-SPR intimated at trial that Hatch may have diverted some of the construction 
loan money for non-partnership purposes. But there has never been any testimony to the 
effect that Hatch diverted the $78,000 to a non-partnership purpose. 
6 
partnership's interest. Specifically to this latter point, no one has ever suggested that 
Hatch did not represent to EPCO that the money would be used for engineering on 
Northshore I and II, regardless of where the site was to be located.6 In reaffirming the 
debt by change order, Hatch was merely fulfilling a promise he had made earlier to 
provide a contract extra in return for the $78,000 to reimburse EPCO for the cost of the 
site work once the construction loan was in place. At the time the change order was 
signed, as an undisclosed principal of Broadstone, EPCO was not even aware that Hatch 
had 51-SPR as a silent partner. [See, Findings and Conclusions, App. "C," % 6, to 
Appelee's answering brief] Thus, EPCO derived no personal benefit in conferring the 
money to Hatch, other than as the selected contractor for Broadstone, it felt duty-bound 
to see that the site was prepared for the structure EPCO intended to build. [TR. 60-63]. 
EPCO had the right to rely on Hatch's signed change order. Otherwise EPCO may 
have elected not to perform the last portion of the work, it may have declared the owner 
in breach, or it may demanded immediate reimbursement for the monies advanced. 
Hatch's signature on the change order obviated the need for these other extreme 
6
 Throughout 51-SPR's reply brief, it distorts the trial courts findings as well as 
the evidence concerning the $78,000. For example, on pages 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 
and 17 of 51-SPR's reply brief, it emphatically states, as though it were an established 
fact, that the $78,000 was definitely used for engineering on the William's property. 
However, the testimony below - and the findings of the trial court- were to the effect that 
although Mr. Ellsworth thought the money would be used for engineering site drawings 
for either the William's property or for Northshore Automall property, no one knew 
where the $78,000 was actually applied. [See. Findings and Conclusions, App. "C," %f 
3,4,5, 25, to Appelee's answering brief; TR. 61-63]. 
7 
measures, and allowed the partnership to continue to the fruition of the project based 
upon the signed promise to pay. The partnership clearly derived a benefit in issuing the 
change order. Finally, with Hatch and his records absent from the proceeding below, 51-
SPR has not shown that the $78,000 was spent on exactly what Hatch represented it 
would be used for, namely, the design and site work for Northshore I and II. As between 
51-SPR as Hatch's partner, and an innocent third-party contractor, all doubt should be 
resolved in favor of EPCO who provided funds for the project, or thought that it was 
providing funds for the project. It simply can not be argued in this context that Hatch's 
actions were not at least in part in furtherance of partnership goals and objectives. This 
is so particularly from EPCO's stand point, who was not even aware of 51-SPR at the 
time of the advance or the change order. Its only motivation was in having the site 
prepared to receive the buildings it was going to construct. 
Even if one were to accept at face value 51-SPR's inference that Hatch may not 
have used the money for a partnership purpose, such a conclusion is of no consequence 
to an innocent creditor of the partnership who acts in reliance on one partner's 
representations. As long as Hatch was within the scope of his authority, even a fraudulent 
act is binding on the partnership. Wardley, 61 P.3d, Supra at 1018. And "[w]hen an 
[agent's] activity is so clearly within or outside of the scope of employment that 
reasonable minds can not differ, the court may decide the issue as a matter of law." On 
the face of this transaction, Hatch's action were within the general parameters of what a 
8 
construction manager has authority to do, it was in the time and spacial bonderizes of his 
agency, and his actions were on their face, at least partially motivated by a partnership 
purpose. 
B. EPCO Has Marshaled the Facts Supporting its Position, the Issue Is to Be 
Reviewed De Novo, and the Trial Court Made No Factual Findings on the Effect 
of Change Order No. 3. 
51-SPR argues at page 13 of its brief in opposition to the cross appeal that EPCO 
has marshaling problems. This statement is incorrect on three counts: First, as noted in 
the cross-appeal brief, the agency issue of whether the change order was binding on the 
partnership as a partnership debt was raised in a summary judgment.7 [R. 7393-7509; 
7827-7900]. This summary judgment motion is reviewed de novo, with no deference to 
the trial court. Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054 (Utah 2002). 
Second, EPCO adequately marshaled all of the testimony and evidence at trail relevant to 
the $78,000 in its brief in opposition at page 37. Third, although EPCO respectfully 
disagrees with the holding, EPCO's argument on appeal is that even if one takes the 
factual holdings of the trial court for face value: namely, that the $78,000 was incurred 
before the partnership was formed, that it was not a partnership debt, or that it related to 
an adjoining parcel, the debt was ratified and adopted by the partnership at the execution 
of change order No. 3. This latter act raises a stand-alone subsidiary issue of whether the 
7
 The issue was argued in conjunction with a brief asking for summary judgment 
on a number of change orders, with specific arguments as to the $78,000 change order. 
9 
advance is a partnership debt. The trial court's rulings focused exclusively on the nature 
of the relationship at the time the $78,000 was advanced, [See, Findings and 
Conclusions, App. "C," to Appelee's answering brief], but ignored the issue probed by 
this appeal as to the effect of the change order in converting the debt from a personal one 
to a partnership obligation. In short, the trial court made no ruling on the effect of the 
$78,000 when viewed in the light of a ratification or assumption of the debt issue by way 
of the change order, although it was a portion of the argument made on that point. The 
trial court is obligated to make a ruling on each substantive legal issue present to him by 
the litigants. Silliman v. Powell, 642 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1982); Ruckerv. Dalton, 598 
P.2d 1336, 1339 (Utah 1979). Yet in the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the $78,000 
was not a partnership obligation at the time it was advanced in its findings and 
conclusions, [See, Findings and Conclusions, App. "C," to Appelee's answering brief] ] 
but the order is silent on the agency issues or the effect of the change order on the 
$78,000 in converting it to a partnership obligation. 
C. The Agency and Scope of Authority Issues Related to the $78,000 were 
Preserved at the Trial Court Level. 
51-SPR also argues at page 16 of its rely brief that the agency issues for the 
$78,000 was not preserved for appeal. ["By failing to preserve these arguments below, 
EPCO has waived them."] Attached to this reply brief as Addendum "B" are several 
pages from the opening and closing arguments in this case in which the agency issue was 
clearly argued and presented to the court. It was presented in both ways - both as to the 
10 
issue of Hatch's authority when he first obtained the $78,000 - but also, it will be seen -
that it was argued as a matter of agency law in light of the change order. As noted above, 
it was also argued in a portion of the brief in which the issue was raised in summary 
judgment. [R. 7393-7509; 7826-7900]. Based upon the brief and opening and closing 
arguments at trial, it appears clear from the record that the issue was preserved both as it 
related to the relationship of the parties at the time the money was advanced, [a 
proposition rejected by the trial court] and as an agency question based upon the change 
order. 
II. THE CONTRACT DUE DATES, AMOUNTS, AND INTEREST THAT 
51-SPR FAILED TO PAY WERE COMPLETE, FIXED, AND 
LIQUIDATED AS OF THE DATE OF TRIAL, AND IT WAS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR NOT TO PERMIT RECOVERY FOR 
CONTRACTUAL INTEREST ON THOSE SUMS. 
A. Contractual Interest Is Always Liquidated, and Even If it Were Not, the Dates 
and the Amounts Owed Are Fixed and Complete.8 
If this Court does not reverse the trial court in its ruling on interest, it is not too 
strong of a statement to say that it may be perhaps the only case in Utah appellate court 
history where a non-breaching partying in a contract action for money damages was 
denied interest on the unpaid debt. This is so whether one views the interest obligation as 
contractual in nature as in this case, or as an element of common law damages. "In 
contract cases, certainly, interest on amounts found to be due in judicial proceedings is 
recovery to which the creditor is due a matter of law." Lignell v. Berg, 593 P2d 800, 809 
8
 This section replies to Part VI of 51-SPR's Reply brief, pp. 22-25. 
11 
(Utah 1979). [Emphasis added]. Breach of contract damages seek to restore the non-
breaching party to the position he or she would have been in but for the breach. 
Consolidated Coal v. Division of State Lands, 886 P.2d 514, 524, (Utah 1994). In Utah, 
interest must be paid on agreed-upon amounts, in order that the breaching party is not 
unjustly enriched by its failure to pay amounts due under the contract. Canyon Country 
Store v. Bracey, 781 P.d 414, 422 (Utah 1998). This is so because "paying money with 
interest is, in effect, precisely the same as paying it when it became due without interest." 
Mont Trucking v. Entrada Industries, 802 P.2d 799, ft. nt. 1 (Utah App. 1990). Without 
being paid interest on an un-paid contract debt, the non-breaching party can not be made 
whole. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P.3d 188, (Utah App. 2003). Utah appellate 
courts have unilaterally directed that interest be paid, even when neither party requested 
interest in the proceeding below or on appeal. Progressive Music Supply, Inc. v. 
McKean, 515 P.2d 616 (Utah 1973). A litigants failure to "plead a request for interest is 
of no consequence because " the interest issue is injected by law into every action for the 
payment of past due money." Fitsgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.d 301 304 (Utah App. 
1987) (Quoting Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979). Moreover, "[a}ny 
judgment entered into on a lawful contract shall bear the interest agreed upon by the 
parties." Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(2). The "shall" language in §15-1-4 does not admit 
of any trial court discretion to disallow such interest. Stroud v. Stroud, 733 P.2d 649, 
650 (Utah App. 1987). 
The trial court held that "the evidence establishes that 51-SPR failed and refused 
12 
to pay the June, July and August, 2002 draw requests, thereby breaching its contract with 
Ellsworth Paulsen/' [Findings and Conclusions, p. 9, App. "C," of the answering brief]. 
The trial court went on to hold that: 'The court further finds that Ellsworth Paulsen 
completed all of the required work, and there is no evidence to establish that any of the 
work is defective or otherwise has problems." Id. The forgoing conclusions are 
inherently inconsistent with and inimical to a holding that EPCO is not entitled to interest 
on over $500,000 which 51-SPR wrongfully held for over two and one half years up to 
the date judgment was entered.9 Such a holding fails to take into account the time value 
of money, such that EPCO will not be made whole for exactly $188,401.33, if it is not 
allowed interests for the period of time in question. 10 Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P. 
3d 188, 205 (Utah App. 2003)( Holding that interest must be awarded in order to make 
the plaintiff whole from the loss of use of his money over time). The above sum 
represents the interest on the money not paid, calculated from 30 days after final work, 
inspection, and occupancy of the building by 51-SPR. [Interest Schedules, App. "C" 
hereto]. The court awarded judgment for contract balances on Northshore I of 
$199,830.53, and on Northshore II of $283,991.26.u The dates those sums became 
9
 The court did award the contractual interest post-judgment. 
10
 At the conclusion of trial, the court requested the parties to provide the interest 
calculations and to brief the same. The numbers or the amounts are not in dispute, as 
both parties reached the same calculation, except that 51-SPR's schedule disallowed 
interest for the three months of draws not submitted to Guy Hatch. [App. "C" herof]. 
11
 If this court permits recovery of the $78,000, this sum, and interest thereon at 
10% per annum as set forth in the contract, should be added into the judgment on 
13 
payable is arrived in one of two ways: 1) either 30 days after the work was performed for 
which such payments were requested as set forth in the contract; or, 2) 30 days after final 
completion and acceptance of the project, 12 as EPCO has claimed. EPCO submitted 
evidence to the court based upon the latter date out of an abundance of deference to the 
outside date upon which interest might become due. Either way, the amounts are fixed, 
and complete, and utterly liquidated. 
The trial court's justification for denying interest is as follows: 
With regard to Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for prejudgment interest, the 
Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen can not recovery [sic] its claim for 
prejudgment interest against 51-SPR. It is undisputed that Ellsworth 
Paulsen never submitted to anyone its final payment application on 
Building I or the final two applications on Building II. These three 
applications remain unsigned. It is not possible for the court to set a 
specific date on which the payment of the un-submitted applications 
became due. The Court has considered the information submitted by the 
parties subsequent to the time of trail with respect to the calculation of pre-
judgment interest and the court can not, as Ellsworth Paulsen suggests, 
simply "pick a date" from which interest begins to accrue. [App. "C," f 39, 
p. 15 of EPCO's answering brief]. 
The above legal conclusion is a matter of law and is reviewed for correctness, 
with no deference to the trial court. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P. 3d 188, 205 (Utah 
Northshore II. 
12
 The trial court apparently believed this date to be too random to result in a 
liquidated calculation. Yet we could find nothing in the jurisprudence of Utah which 
permits interest to be waived on real property instruments, installment obligations, or 
notes, simply because of an absence of demand, invoicing, or a timely statement. The 
proper approach is to take the last date upon which payment could be due, even without 
an invoice, and run the interest calculation from that date. This is how EPCO arrived at 
its figure. 
14 
App. 2003). In addition, where there is an unambiguous contract clause which addresses 
the subject of interest, the trial court's conclusions with respect to such a contract 
interpretation is also reviewed for correctness. Id. The above analysis by the trial court 
is flawed on two counts: First it blurs the distinction between contract interest and 
common law damage interest. In the former case, interest is as substantive a part of the 
debt as is the principal. It is a component of recovery that is liquidated by the parties' 
agreement to the same extent, and in the same way the principal is liquidated. One can 
not find that the debtor breached the contract and that principal is owed, and 
correspondingly not find that the contractual interest is also owed. Famsworth v., 
Jensen, 217 P.2d 494 (Utah 1950). Failure to pay the contract, whether principal or 
interest, is a breach, and the interest is an element of damages that necessarily flows from 
the finding of the non-payment. 
Second, even if the trial court's statement involved a holding on common law 
damage interest, the holding is incorrect, because the debt amounts are complete, fixed, 
and certain, and are, therefore, liquidated, requiring an award of interest. Bjork v. April 
Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977). 
In Farnsworth, 217 Supra at 496, property purchasers refused to pay interest on a 
farm due to the seller's default in clearing title to the farm. The court held that even the 
default of the sellers in failing to clear title could not suspend contractual interest. Id at 
496. The court went on to hold that the only way the buyers could suspend contractual 
interest was for them to have tendered the amount of the interest into the court or into 
15 
escrow. Id. The Court held that Interest can only be suspended when the debtor 
manifests that it is ready, willing, and able to pay the obligation, but is prevented from 
doing so by some affirmative act of the creditor. Id. The court held that the buyers could 
not enjoy the benefits of occupying the property bought under contract, while claiming 
that the interest set forth in the contract was suspended because the title was not clear. 
Id. 
51-SPR argues in its reply brief at page 21-22 that the trial court was correct 
because the contract specifies that no payment by Broadstone was due until the draw was 
submitted. What 51-SPR fails to candidly acknowledge to the court is that long before 
EPCO stopped submitting the draws, Broadstone had failed to timely pay or process 
draws. Broadstone had abandoned the project, preventing the processing of draws. The 
draws are on standard AIA Form G702 (1992) forms. These forms require change orders 
to be integrated into the draw calculation so that the contract price is duly adjusted. They 
also require the signature of the architect, or, if the owner assumes that duty, as it did in 
this instance, it requires the signature of the owner. Where the owner (both Hatch and 
51-SPR) refuses to speak with you, refuses to process change orders, and refuses to sign 
draws, there is simply no way for EPCO to finalize the same on form G702. To permit 
51-SPR to ignore its contractual duty to process and pay draws, then reward that 
dereliction by suspending the agreed-upon interest for over two years on the flimsy 
premise that EPCO's lack of invoicing excused interest, is to elevate form over 
substance, triviality over materiality. 
16 
51-SPR gives new definition to legal hair-splitting when it contends that it had 
no duty to pay, since the draw was not finalized. Under this scenario, 51-SPR can enjoy 
all of the benefits of the construction contracts, including turn-key completion of the 
buildings by scores of workers, but excuse its performance by an ambiguity in the 
invoicing. All this while 51-SR is ignoring numerous demands to Hatch and to 51-SPR , 
verbally, and in letters: liens, threats, suits and demands, even in months before and up 
to the time the project was completed. 51-SPR had one duty under its contract, namely, 
to timely pay. Yet as of the date of this brief, 51-SPR has steadfastly repudiated any 
obligation to pay for construction work on the project. These actions are not consistent 
with the Farnsworth requirement that contract interest can only be suspended when the 
debtor tenders payments, or manifests that it is ready willing and able to pay, but is 
prevented from doing so by the creditor. Id at 496. 
B. Interest Is Due on the Full Amount Appearing in the Contract, and Should Not 
Be Reduced by Common Law Damages Interest Paid to the Subcontracts on the 
Eve of Trial. 
51SPR argues at page 24 of its reply that EPCO's suggestion that it should be paid 
contractual interest on the full amount owed up to the date 51-SPR paid the 
subcontractors 13 (under judgment by the trial court) is "overreaching." It predicates this 
13
 The schedules appearing in App. "D" hereof take into account a reduction of 
the interest owed on the contract balances equal to the amounts paid to the 
subcontractors. But the $188,401.33 requested in this appeal contemplates payment to 
EPCO of interest on all contract amounts due, until the subcontractors were paid full, 
without a deduction for prejudgment interest paid to the subcontractors on the door-steps 
17 
argument on the stretched-to- the-breaking-point notion that since EPCO did not keep 
51-SPR indemnified from amounts owed to subcontractors, (even though 51-SPR did not 
itself pay those amounts) 51-SPR had to pay interest to the subcontractors. What this 
argument fails to take into account is that EPCO had a "pay when paid" clause in its 
subcontracts, such that it literally was not obligated to pay to its subcontractors anything 
until it was paid by 51-SPR. Thus, at no time were the subcontractors owed contractual 
interest by EPCO, even though they collected pre-judgment damage interest from 51-
SPR on their lien and failure-to-obtain-a- bond claims. The amount due EPCO for 
interest on its contract is for all amounts not paid by 51-SPR, under the prime contract. 
EPCO's entitlement to interest on the full amount due, should not be reduced by an 
interest amount it did not, and does not owe to sub-contractors below. There is no 
'double recovery" or "wind-fall," since 51-SPR will only be paying the interest it 
contracted to pay. The interest that the trial court ordered14 to be paid to the 
subcontractors was damages interest owed, which was completely independent of 
EPCO's contract. In order to keep faith with the terms of the contract, EPCO should be 
paid interest on the full payments wrongfully withheld by 51-SPR, without regard or 
deduction for amounts paid to subcontractors under separate legal theories and pre-
judgment damage calculations. 
of trial. 
14
 EPCO finds it curious that the trial court could hold that 51-SPR was liable for 
pre-judgment interest owed to subcontractors on amounts not paid through EPCO, but 
denied interest under the contract for amounts not paid to EPCO. 
18 
As guardians of the law, and of the "fairness" and "justice" principles enshrined in 
the law, EPCO asks this Court of Appeals to make it whole by awarding interest on the 
amounts not paid by 51-SPR under its joint venture contract. 
III. IF EPCO PREVAILS ON APPEAL, IT REQUESTS ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEAL. 
As part of its cross-appeal, EPCO requests attorney fees on appeal. Such fees, are 
appropriate where fees were awarded below in a mechanic's lien action, and the same 
party prevails on appeal. J.V. Hatch Construction, Inc. v. Kapros, 971 P.2d 8, 16 (Utah 
App. 1998). 
CONCLUSION 
On cross-appeal, EPCO requests that this court reverse the trial court to reimburse 
EPCO for the $78,000 it advanced to Broadstone as a partnership debt, as memorialized, 
affirmed and ratified by Broadstone in Change Order No. 3. to the prime contract. EPCO 
also requests that it be given judgment for interest on the $78,000, as well as reversal of 
the trial court in its denial of $188,401.33 in interest for monies wrongfully withheld by 
51-SPR in contract balances. Lastly, since attorney fees were granted below, EPCO 
requests its attorney fees on appeal. 
In opposition to 51-SPR, EPCO requests that the Court of Appeals: 1) uphold the 
trial court's ruling granting contract liability on the joint venture issue; 2) uphold the trial 
court in granting a mechanic's lien to EPCO for the balance owed; 3) uphold the trial 
court in its factual findings regarding the effective date of the lien waivers and the 
19 
indemnities; 4) uphold the trial court's findings that the lien filed by EPCO was not 
abusive; and 5) uphold the trial court's award of attorney fees. 
1lL 
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Erik Olson 
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1 there's change orders on every project in America The national 
2 average is that there is a 13 percent change orders per project, 
3 and so change orders are going to occur. Architects can't design 
4 to mathematical certainly, and you're going to have additions. 
5 The Court only has to ask himself one, you know, if Guy 
6 Hatch had the authority, then it's over. If he didn't have the 
7 authority do we still get it? That's going to pertain to another 
8 approximately $70,000, the difference between those two. We're 
9 going to go through them one by one and show the Court that 
10 (inaudible) those were hollow doors, now they're solid mahogany 
11 doors. There was Monticello (inaudible) faucets and now there's 
12 chrome faucets and (inaudible) one by one on those 40 change 
1 3 orders. 
14 A second issue on the change orders, your Honor, on the 
15 $73,000 Williams property -- or (inaudible) let's just go to --
16 we're going to show the Court a signed change order. It's not 
17 signed late. It wasn't one of the ones that were signed later 
18 on. It was signed by Guy Hatch early m this process while he 
19 very clearly had authority. 
20 Your Honor, that's the beginning and the ending analysis 
21 on the $78,000. There's a signed change order by a partner, 
22 that's a partnership debt. It is every time. 
23 In addition to whether it's a partnership debt, and 
24 it's absolutely a partnership debt. I don't think there's any 
25 I question. We have a signed change order. That's all. The 
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authority is (inaudible) on that. 
In addition to the issue of whether it's a partnership 
debt is the issue of whether or not it's lienable I'll just say 
this to the Court If there's a contract modification, an 
authentic $78,000 modification to this contract, that's a 
contract. A change order is a contract. Whenever you have a 
contract it's lienable 
Counsel is trying to make the argument m this case 
that, "Gee, if it doesn't actually get incorporated into the 
project it's not lienable." That's not correct, your Honor. If 
there's a contract or a construction contract, and even if it has 
components that don't actually go to the project, you can still 
lien it. (Inaudible) overhead, a mechanical design, an 
electrical design. Oh, they don't go into the project They're 
not consumed. They don't become structures on the land, but 
they're recoverable as part of the construction contract. 
So there's two ways to get a lien in Utah. Either you 
have a construction agreement and you lien for the amount of your 
agreement, or you improve real property like the subs did this 
home agreement and those are two legitimate ways to get a lien in 
Utah. 
The subs improved the property. This one isn't a direct 
improvement -- I mean we' re going to show that it does improve 
the property, that it benefitted this property very dramatically. 
We're going to show that, your Honor. But quiet and apart for 
OR. /, ^ , 
'•m% / 
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looked at those change order documents, those books, there's tiny 
margins, two percent margins (inaudible) to Ellsworth Paulsen on 
markup on those change orders, that my client incurred $200,000 
in change orders. It paid those amounts or will pay them. 
Those are costs to them, and they don't just vanish into 
thin air They don't just get forfeited because lack of 
formality done on our part, or a lack of diligence but strictly 
on their part, your Honor. That's ]ust -- that's not right. So 
that's not defense, your Honor. It's not even close to a defense 
in this case. 
Now I'm willing to move on from the change orders the 
famous $78,000. I think the Court's heard more about $78,000 in 
the last two years than it ever wants to hear. But there's a 
central issue in that $78,000, your Honor, and that is that 
(inaudible) number, Guy Hatch while fully vested with authority, 
while fully clothed with apparent actual, implied authority came 
to my client and said, "Here's a change order for the $78,000." 
Now it's the testimony of these folks and these people 
that say that that applied to the Williams property. My client 
didn't say it applied to the Williams property. My client said 
that Mr Hatch came to him and said, "We're going to develop 
North Shore II and you're going to be the contractor on it. I 
need $78,000 for the design work for it. You have design 
responsibilities under your contract, and if you'll work it this 
way with me, I will give you a change order for design work." 
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Whether that went to Mark Wilson, whether it went to 
Hubble Engineering for the site work on the present site of the 
North Shore building, nobody has presented any evidence of where 
that $78,000 was spent by Guy Hatch. Nobody r.as presented this 
Court whether it's the Williams property or the North Shore 
property. There's not a scintilla of evidence on it. All my 
client knows is that he was promised a change order. 
Your Honor, I ask you to look very carefully on that 
exhibit. The date on that is in March of 2002 -- March of 2002 
while Guy Hatch had full authority. Your Honor, this is a simple 
agency issue. Don't be diverted by allegations in the related to 
another property or any of those things. Mr. -- well all know. 
Everybody knows that Mr. Hatch was a principal of an undisclosed 
agent. A principal of an undisclosed agent is liable as is the 
principal. They are both liable for that debt. 
Now if Mr. Hatch wants to go off and buy a pickup truck 
for the partnership, I ask the Court, is that binding on the 
partnership? Of course it is, your Honor. He has authority. 
He's the managing member. He's vested with complete authority. 
Somebody got up -- I think Mr. Chimento got up and said he didn't 
have authority to incur debt on some other property. Well, first 
of all, we don't know if it was on some other property, but 
secondly, your Honor, we have a bona fide change order that's a 
contract. A contract is no different than if Guy Hatch had gone 
to Hubble himself and said -- and incurred that contract for 
-627-
1 $78,000. He could have gone to Hubbs Tile or Allstate Electric 
2 or any of the prime contractors and given them a contract for 
3 $78,000. He happened to do it with my client, and he promised to 
4 pay him $78,000 . 
5 Keep in mind, your Honor, my client gave him that money. 
6 My client drew a check from his bank. That partnership 
7 benefitted from it. I don't know what Guy Hatch did with it. 
8 That's not my client's responsibility. I don't know whether he 
9 spent it at the circus, but he agreed to give him a change order 
10 and he gave him a change order, and he had full authority when he 
11 did that. 
12 THE COURT: What do you do about the testimony of your 
13 own client saying, "I really didn't know where that money went. 
14 I didn't even -- I didn't do anything to find out where it went," 
15 and the fact that he testified as far as he was concerned it 
16 seemed like a lot of money for what he saw being done, and it 
17 wasn't even done on buildings I or II. 
18 MR. POULSEN: Your Honor, what the testimony -- I mean I 
19 want to be very clear about this. The testimony was that he 
20 didn't know whether it was spent by Hubble on that project, it 
21 was paid to Hubble on the Williams property or whether it was 
22 spent on the North Shore property. 
23 The Court has an invoice from Hubble Engineering that 
24 was part of the prove-up in this case from Hubble Engineering for 
25 I $95,000 on the North Shore property. There's engineering --
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'A / ^ K ^ SUMMARY OF INTEREST DUE ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS 
st # 
1 Date 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/200 1 
3 /6 /2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6 /2001 
3/6/200 1 
3/6/2001 
3/6/200 1 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
4 /16 /2001 
none 
12/15/2000 
1/11/200 l 
5 /31/2001 
5 /31/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7 /17/2001 
7/17/2001 
none 
none 
Due Date 
4 /5 /2001 
4 /5 /2001 
4 /5 /2001 
4 /5 /2001 
4 /5 /2001 
4 /5 /2001 
4 /5 /2001 
4 /5 /2001 
4 /5 /2001 
4 /5 /2001 
4 /5 /2001 
4 /5 /2001 
5 /16 /2001 
none 
1/14/2001 
2 /10 /2001 
6 /30 /2001 
6 /30 /2001 
8 /16 /2001 
8 /16 /2001 
8 /16 /2001 
8 /16 /2001 
8 /16 /2001 
none 
none 
Date Paid 
4 /16 /2001 
5/7/2001 
6 /27 /2001 
7/5/2001 
7/18/2001 
7/26/2001 
7/3 1/2001 
8 /10/200 1 
1 2^21/2002 
10/14/20U3 
12/10/2003 
not paid 
not paid 
not paid 
2/2/2UU1 
2 /21/2001 
7/31/200 1 
10 /15 /2003 
12 /31 /2002 
10 /15 /2003 
10 /15 /2003 
12/10/2003 
not paid 
not paid 
not paid 
Invoice A m o u n t 
% 47 ,429 87 
$ 
$ 
% 
$ 
$ 
$ 
i 
$ 
5 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
s 
$ 
$ 
% 
$ 
$ 
$ 
% 
£ 
$ 
$ 
27,938 67 
8,000 00 
26,974 91 
10,343 70 
34,260 58 
3,961 18 
11,139 70 
800 80 
2 089 02 
16 I33 59 
36,457 43 
87,138 17 
76,234 93 
345,284 19 
260 ,050 42 
7,342 50 
1,710 86 
10,601 00 
1 19,425 00 
32 ,978 .00 
59,599 41 
63,513 28 
197,079 64 
78,465 15 
Days Late 
11 
32 
83 
91 
104 
112 
117 
127 
635 
922 
979 
991 
950 
0 
19 
11 
31 
837 
502 
790 
790 
846 
858 
0 
0 
Interest Rate 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
T O T A L 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
10 0 % 
T O T A L 
I 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
J 
% 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
s 
$ 
£ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
nterest Due 
142 94 
244 94 
181 92 
672 53 
294 72 
1,051 28 
126 97 
387 60 
-
9,898 44 
22,679 80 
-
35,681 15 
1,797 37 
783 71 
62 36 
-
-
-
-
-
14,929 97 
i 
17,573.42 
Hansen settlement 
We-otwood settlement 
Halvurson settlement 
never submitted 
Allbtato settlement 
Hansen settlement 
Allstate settlement 
Westwood settlement 
Halvei son settlement 
aftei deducting $ 19,632 90 
in invalid COs (Def Ex 37) 
ne\/er submitted 
never submitted 
GRAND TOTAL FOR BOTH BUILDINGS $ 53,254.56 
